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Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 5th Edition, P. 137 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
"\IARY LOUISE GERARD, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
PRESTON L. YOUNG and 
UNICE YOUNG, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Case No. 
10712 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by Plaintiff-Respondent 
seeking to forfeit a lease for a term of years based on 
Defendants-Appellants' alleged "payoffs" on pinball ma-
:hines and punch boards. Delinquent rental is not an 
issue. 
This action has been treated as if in unlawful 
detainer under 78-36-1, et seq., 1953 UCA, though not 
pleaded. The pleading theory of plaintiff is that a lease 
provision has been violated by defendants and the lease 
should be rescinded, ( R2, Paragraph 6). 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The following hurried sequence of events took 
place: 
1. Complaint for lease cancellation and for restitu· 
tion of the leasehold was filed June 13, 1966 (R. 11. 
Time for answer was shortened to three days, arranged 
ex parte, with no reference to statutory authority, if any, 
to do it (R. 1, 2, 3). 78-36-8, 1953 UCA seems to re· 
quire a rental delinquency in order for the court to 
shorten time of answer. 
2. Ans\ver was filed June 15, denying gambling 
or right to restitution of premises if there was gambling 
(R. 8). 
3. Defendants-Appellants filed motion for summan 
judgment on June 15, 1966 (R. 12), noticed for argu· 
ment July 5, 1966 ( R. 11). 
4. Counsel for plaintiff-respondent obtained special 
pretrial setting for 12 p.m., June 22, 1966, though 
notice of readiness for trial was not f ilecl by plaintiff 
until July 1, 1966 (R. 22). 
5. There was no judge for the special pretrial hear· 
ing on June 22, 1966, so plaintiff continued it to June 
24, 1966. On June 24, the pretrial judge ordered a 
further pretrial to be held on September 30, 1966 and 
placed the case on the jury trial calendar for Octobe1 
26, 1966. 
6. On July 30, 1966, plaintiff-respondent filed m~· 
tion for summary judgment, also to be heard on Juh J 
1966 (R. 14). 
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7. Plaintiff-respondent's motion for summary judg-
ment was supported by three affidavits alleging receipts 
of "payoffs" at the leasehold premises, (R. 16, 17, 19). 
Defendants-appellants filed an affidavit in opposition to 
plaintiff's affidavits stating there was no acquaintance 
11ith plaintiff's affiants and that defendants-appellants 
\''CfP entitled to examine those persons under oath and 
test th<"ir veracity and interest in the subject of the liti-
gation to overcome the self-serving nature and hearsay 
ch~1ractcristics in those affidavits submitted by plaintiff, 
rR. 23). 
8. Both motions for summary judgment were argued 
July 5, 1966. 
9. Memorandum decision granting plaintiff-respond-
ent's motion for summary judgment was issued by the 
Trial Court July 6, 1966 (R. 25). 
10. On July 8, 1966 defendants-appellants made 
motion for reconsideration of the memorandum deci-
sion ( R. 29) , which was supported by further affidavit 
of rldcndants-appellants stating that the affidavits per-
taining to "payoffs" were, to the best knowledge and 
belief of affiant, false (R. 26). 
11. Based upon the motion to reconsider, with sup-
porting affidavit, the Court ordered both parties' motions 
for summary judgment denied and ordered that the 
matter remain on the pretrial calendar for Friday, Sep-
tember 30, 1966 and that Trial be held Wednesday, 
October 2G, 1966, as previously scheduled. The Court 
in tlw order of July 8, affirmatively found that there 
1' ei <' 11uestions of fact to be determined at trial ( R. 30). 
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12. On July 13, again ex parte, plaintiff's cournrl 
obtained a trial setting for July 19, 1966 (R. 34), <le 
spite the July 8 order that trial would be October 26, 
1966 ( R. 30) . 
13. On July 13, 1966, defendants-appellants filed 
objection to the July 19 trial setting ( R. 33), noticing 
hearing on objection for July 18, 1966 (R. 31 ). Hearin~ 
on the objection was had before the Honorable Albert 
H. Ellett, who refused to proceed with the matter since 
the special trial setting had been obtained before the 
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson. The court was on vaca-
tion on July 19, 1966, with no reporter and no jun 
was on hand, despite defendants-appellants demand for 
jury having been filed and a jury fee having been paid 
(R. 32). 
Trial was not held July 19, 1966, though plaintiffs 
counsel offered to obtain a court reporter and pay for 
him. Plaintiff's counsel was not, however, successful in 
persuading the clerk of the court to summons a jury, in 
the face of appellant's objection. 
14. July 19, 1966, defendants-appellants filed peti-
tion to the Supreme Court of Utah for an interlocuton 
appeal, which was denied by the court in Case 10692. 
July 27, 1966. 
15. Under date of July 19, 1966, plaintiff-respond-
ent noticed the taking of defendant's deposition for July 
26, 1966. Notice was filed with the Court July 27, 1966 1 
(R. 34). 
16. The deposition of defendant, Preston L. Young. 
was taken .July 29, 1966 ( R. 60). He refused to ans11·er 
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questions concerning pinballs and punch boards based 
011 th<' self-incrimination provisions of the 5th amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. 
17. Under date of July 21, 1966 plaintiff-respond-
ent again filed motion for summary judgment based 
11pon previous allegations and affidavits set forth in the 
first motion for summary judgment heard on July 5, 
1966. The motion was filed July 27. ( R. 36). 
18. The same matter having already been argued 
anrl ruled on by the Trial Court, was again heard and 
agrued on August 9, 1966. 
19. On August 9, 1966, the day of the second argu-
ment, the Trial Court made and entered its order grant-
ing plaintiff-respondent's latest motion for summary 
judgment, from which order this appeal is taken. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
1. Defendants-appellants seek decision that having 
pinballs and punch boards on cafe premises, even if 
"payoffs" are made, is not sufficient grounds to found 
an action in unlawful detainer. 
2. Appellants seek ruling that if there were "pay-
offs" on pinball machines and punch boards then the 
Utah gambling statutes are unconstitutional and such 
conduct is not unlawful. 
3. In the alternative, appellants seek ruling that the 
issue of gambling be decided by a jury; and that gamb-
ling, if any, as an "unlawful business" under 78-36-3 ( 4), 
1953 UCA, or as a "material breach" of lease be de-
termined hy a jury these questions being issues of fact, 
6 
not properly ruled on as a matter of law by the Trial 
Court. 
ST ATEMENTOF FACTS 
In 1964, plaintiff and defendant extended a prior 
lease made in 1962, and entered into a new three year 
lease commencing April 15, 1965 for a cafe and caft 
equipment at 890 West 2100 South Street, Salt Lake 
County. There was prepayment by appellants of $1,500 
under the new lease, as rental for the last 5 months of 
the new term, which expires May 14, 1968. 
Monthly rentals payments of $300 were always paid 
when due, or in advance. 
Without consent or knowledge of appellants, plain- 1 
tiff executed lease agreement on August 13, 1965, \1it!t 
American Oil Company, covering certain other propert1, 
but including the property already under lease to ap 
pellants. Under the American Oil Company lease, plain-
tiff received the sum of $4,500 as advance rental for th1 
first 6 months, together with the sum of $1,500, in return 
for which plaintiff was to obtain cancellation of clefencl-
ants-appellants' lease ( R. 4 7). 
The "cancellation" attempt resulting from this agree-
ment with American Oil Company was the hiring of 
persons who executed affidavits in support of plaintiff, 
first motion for summary judgment based on gambling 
( R. 16, 1 7, 19) . The $1,500 lease prepayment made bi 
appellants was tendered into court by plaintiff upo11 
filing the complaint. It is the same amount gotten frorn 
American Oil Company in consideration for getting de 
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fcndants off the property later leased to American Oil 
Company, despite appellants' prior lease. 
The $1,500 received by plaintiff from American 
Oil Company and tendered into court by plaintiff was, 
of course, promptly sequestered and taken back on the 
same clay of the last argument for summary judgment, 
pursuant to the order signed that day ( R. 55). 
The clay after the order was signed, appellants re-
ceived phone notice of the entry of judgment, but not 
of the order for release of money. Appellants were not 
served a copy of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment until about a week later. It will be 
noted that the certificate of mailing on the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law is blank, and is erroneous, 
R-54, giving good further reflection of the cavalier atti-




"PAYOFFS" ON PUNCH BOARDS AND PINBALL 
MACHINES IN A CAFE IS NOT SUFFICIENT 
GROUNDS TO FOUND AN ACTION IN UNLAW-
FUL DETAINER OR TO CAUSE FORFEITURE 
OF A LEASE. 
Lt isn't disputed that plaintiff's sole claim to lease 
forfeiture and restitution of premises is founded on al-
IFgerl "payoffs'' by defendants on puch boards and pin-
hall machines, as is apparent from plaintiff's complaint, 
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R. 1; plaintiff's notice of April 11, 1966, R. 4; and the 
notice of June 3, 1966, R. 6. 
Defendants contend that even if there were "pay. 
offs," which to this point is not proved it being an issue 
of fact, then the harsh remedy of unlawful detainer and 
forfeiture should not be made available to plaintiff to 
cancel this lease, but rather plaintiff's remedy would 
be an action for damages or for injunctive relief. 
This particular point was raised in a lessor's at-
tempt to forfeit a lease because horse-race bets were 
taken by the lessee of a cafe. The California District 
Court of Appeals decided in Keating vs. Preston, 108 
Pac. 2nd 479, that forfeiture would not be permitted even 
though there was an illegal use by gambling. The Cali-
fornia court held that lessor's proper action was in dam-
ages or for an injunction, not forfeiture which is histori· 
cally frowned upon by the courts. 
Appellants also urge the court to consider that 
having pinball machines and punch boards on these cafc 
premises is not the reason for this action, but rather 
it is that plaintiff has been able to obtain a bettrr agree· 
men with a different lessee for much more money. De· 
fendants have been in the cafc business for 25 years 
without any trouble of any kind, and in possession of this 
cafe since 1962 - and isn't it odd that all of this sud· 
denly results when American Oil Company enters the 
scene? 
For the conspiratorial note involved in this hurried 
and abusive action, appellants again emphasize that 
American Oil Company paid $1,500 to plaintiff to ob· 
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ta in cancellation of defendant's lease right ( R. 4 7). 
The great hurry is that the Oil Company wants to tear 
the building down and get on with its own construction 
on appellant's property, ( R. 49). 
As before stated, though this action is treated as 
bring in unlawful detainer, plaintiff's complaint theory 
is breach of agreement. 
Paragraph 6 of plaintiff's complaint, R. 2, reads: 
"It is understood and agreed that the leased 
premises shall be occupied and used as a restau-
rant and caf e only and for no other purpose what-
cwr, and the Youngs agree to conduct said busi-
JH'SS strictly in compliance with law." 
That allegation quotes a provision of the lease, and 
ckfendants claim violation thereof by maintaining a 
"gambling house." 
As pertains to this particular facet of plaintiff's 
claim, appellants call the court's attention to the need 
to establish materially of breach in order to found re-
c1ss10n. 
There is fair summary of the law to be applied 
to the facts here at 12 Am ]ur Contracts, Sec. 440, where 
it is stated: 
"It is not every breach of a contract or failure 
exactly to perform - certainly not every partial 
failure to perform - that entitles the other party 
to rt'scind. 
"A breach which goes only to a part of the 
considnation, is incidental and subordinate to the 
main purpose of the contract, and may be com-
p<'nsatt·d in damages does not warrant a recission 
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of the contract; the injured party is still bound to 
perform his part of the agreement, his only remedv 
for the breach consists of the damages he h~1 
suffered therefrom. A recission is not warranted 
by a breach of contract not so substantial and 
fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties 
in making the agreement. Before partial failure 
of consideration of one party will give the other 
the right of recission, the act failed to be performed 
must go to the root of the contract where tht> fail-
ure to perform the contract must be in respect of 
matters which would render the performance of 
the remainder a thing different in substance from 
that which was contracted for." (Emphasis sup-
plied) 
In the case at bar, what is the state of evidence as 
to the materiality of breach by defendants, if indeed 
there was a breach? : 
1. There are allegations of gambling m the com-
plaint (R. 1). 
2. The allegations arc denied in the answer, claim-
ing if gambling is proved, such is not a material breach 
(R. 8). 
3. There are 3 affidavits by plaintiff's hirelings, 
alleging "payoffs" ( R. 16, 1 7, 19). 
4. There are 2 affidavits by defendants denying 
same (R. 23, 26). 
5. There is defendant's refusal to answer questions 
concerning "payoffs" in his deposition, ( R. 60, pages 3, 
4, 5, 6), based on the 5th amendment to the United 
States Consitution. 
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Since the affidavits and the pleadings now stand in 
equipoise, there is a reserved question of fact for deter-
mination by the jury. 
Also, where is evidence of materiality which can be 
a question of fact? There is none, except what may be 
determined by a jury under proper instructions, if gamb-
ling is found to be the fact by the jury. Further, the 
state of evidence, if the matter is tried as it should be, 
could well warrant a finding as a matter of law, that 
such gambling as may be proved, if at all, is not a sub-
stantial breach that would relieve the landlord from 
continuing to perform her part of the agreement. Her 
remedy would be for damages, if she could prove them. 
The proper remedy for all concerned as appellant 
sees it, would be to let the plaintiff and American Oil 
Company resolve their own differences and teach those 
people that prior written obligations are not to be so 
lightly treated. 
Further, Sec. 78-36-3 ( 4), 1953 UCA, states that to 
found an action in unlawful detainer there must be 
conducted "unlawful business." Appellants contend that 
plaintiff must prove a "business" of gambling, not merely 
an incident of the operation of a cafe business. Both 
concepts, statutory "business" and "breach of a lease 
condition" relate to materiality, which is a question of 
fact. 
The evidence, if this matter is remanded for orderly 
Judicial Proceedings and trial by jury, as is appellants' 
constitutional right, will show there was no statutory 
''unlawful business." 
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Business is defined as "one's regular work occupa-
tion or employment," Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 
St h Edition page 137. Appellants' business is running a 
cafe. If there were payoffs, which respondent must prove, 
then she must also prove that was the "business" of 
appellants, and not just incidental to the business of 
running a cafe. She must prove that the tail wags the dog. 
Point II. 
UTAH STATUTES MAKING "PAY OFFS" ON 
PINBALL MACHINES AND PUNCH BOARDS 
FELONIOUS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL BE-
CAUSE OF INVALID CLASSIFICATION, IM-
PROPER DELEGATION AND AMBIGUITY. 
Gambling offenses in the State of Utah are set forth 
in title 76, chapter 27, Secs. 1 et seq. 1953 Code Anno· 
tated. In the entire chapter, there is only one section 
which reasonably describes the offense of gambling by 
pinball machines and by punch boards, that is Sec. I 
which makes it a felony, supra, D' Orio vs. Startup 
Candy Co., 71 U 410, 26 Pac. 1037. 
Appellants contend that because of that, the entire· 
ty of Title 76, chapter 27 in unconstitutional, as it is 
invalid classification which is prohibited by the provisions 
of Article 1, Section 2 and 24 of the Utah State Con· 
stitution and the 14th amendment to the United States 
Constitution. This is so for the reason that operation of 
pinball machines and punch boards for gaming is made 
a felony, but the operation of a slot machine, for gaming 
or exhibition of bawdy pictures constitutes only a mis· 
demeanor, 76-27-8; lottery is punishable as a misdemean· 
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or, 76-27-9; 76-27-10. The sale of vending tickets or 
other chances is a misdemeanor, 76-27-11, as are the 
1cmaining purportedly proscribed games in the rest of 
the sections of title 76, chapter 27, which include other 
tJ"pes of lottery and bingo; bookmaking; pool selling; 
option selling, and all kinds of contests of chance and 
skill involving speed and powers of endurance of man 
and animal. 
Appellants urge it to be fundamental that for the 
State to make it a felony to play with punch boards and 
pinball machines but only a misdemeanor to run a slot 
machine, horsebook, all types of pool bets and drawings, 
boxing contests, ad infinitum, is obviously so discrimina-
tory that the entire chapter should be stricken, there 
being no savings clause. 
Appellants acknowledge that an act shall not be 
deemed unconstiutional because of discrimination so long 
as there is reasonable basis for differentiation between 
classes and there is proper relation to the purpose to be 
accomplished by reason of difference. 
It would be an onerous burden for this court to 
attempt to uphold apparent legislative expression that 
it is far worse, from a public policy standpoint, to pay 
on a pinball machine or a punch board than it is to 
operate a "one-armed bandit," which crime is only de-
clared to be a misdemeanor, or to play bingo, or take 
brts on the fights or the ponies, all misdemeanors. 
If it be urged that the operation of pinball machines 
and punch boards can be fitted into one of the misde-
rnr;mor sections of title 7 6, chapter 27, then there is 
14 
sufficient ambiguity to render the entire chapter un-
constitutional. 
Further, if pinballs and punch boards can be made 
to fit any of the misdemeanor sections, then the entire 
chapter is also unconstitutional because of unauthorized 
delegation by the legislature of authority to police officers 
and prosecuting attorneys to determine, willy-nilly, wheth-
er a person committing one act should be charged as a 
felon or a misdemeanant. The case of United States vs. 
Louisville Nashville Railroad Company, 176 Federal 942, 
stands for the proposition that a crime can be created 
only by a public act. The language of the act must be 
sufficient to completely declare and define the crime 
and affix the punishment. The court in that case stated 
that it is not competent for congress to delegate to the 
president or to the head of an executive department the 
power to declare what facts may constitute an offense. , 
Appellants also contend there shouldn't be authority to 
determine degree, either - on the same set of facts. 
Southwest Engineering Company vs. Ernst (Ariz), 
291 Pac. 764 states that indefiniteness of a statutory reg· 
ulation may be treated as an invalid delegation of power. 
The case holds that statutory language imposing duties 1 
must be so sufficient and definite as to serve as a guide 
to those who have the duty imposed upon them. If there 
is not sufficient literal significance of language to be 
capable of intelligent interpretation, such act would 
violate the Constitutional mandate, directing that the 
powers of the three branches of government be separate. 
A legislative body cannot confer unlimited power upo~ 
an officer without designating standards to guide his 
15 
action, supra In Re Petersen, 331 Pac. 2nd 24 (Calif.). 
It is respectfully submitted that the gambling stat-
utes of Utah are unconstitutional based on invalid classi-
ficaion and ambiguity. They are also unconstitutional 
because of unauthorized delegation of power if it is found 
that paying off on pinball machines and punch boards 
can be either a misdemeanor or a felony under Utah 
Code. 
It is evident that if there is no crime because of 
these Constitutional objections, then plaintiff-respondent 
has no standing to charge unlawful activity of any 
kind or nature. 
Point III. 
GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHERE 
THERE IS CONTROVERTED MATERIAL FACT 
IS REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor 
of Respondent under Rule 56 ( c) URCP, which is 
authorized: 
"If the pleadings, depositions and admissions 
on file, together with affidavits, if any, show there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a mat-
ter of law. 
Respondent's motion for summary judgment was 
supported by self-serving affidavits of plaintiff's son 
and other paid hirelings. ( R. 16, 1 7, 18, 19) . Each rele-
vant statement of plaintiff's affidavits has been specifi-
cally denied by opposing affidavits executed by defend-
ant-appellant. (R. 23, 26). 
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This court in Christensen vs. Financial Serv1u 
Company, 14 U 2nd 101, 377 Pac 2nd 1010, held that 
conditions for summary judgment are obviously not met 
if the allegations of the pleadings stand in opposition to 
the averments of affidavits so that there are controverted 
issues of fact, the determination of which is necessan 
to settle the rights of the parties. That case distinguished 
Dupler vs. Yates, JO U 2nd 251, 351 Pac. 2nd 624, as 
well as Continental Bank and Trust Company vs. Cun-
ningham, JO Utah 2nd 329, 351 Pac 2nd 168, in which 
cases it was found that the affidavits, exhibits and docu-
mentary evidence did in fact resolve all material facts 
and in which cases the germane affidavits were not 
denied or controverted by opposing affidavits. 
In the case at bar, there is total absence of any 
documentary or other type independent evidence to en-
able the court to find that the facts as claimed by plain-
tiff-respondent are irrefutably established. In this case, 
the allegations in the pleadings stand in opposition to 
what is stated in the self-serving affidavits of plaintiff. 
In addition, the opposing affidavits of defendant ex· 
pressly controverts every material statement contained 
in plaintiff-respondent's affidavits. 
As has been stated, the only additional matter con· 
sidered by the Trial Court in the second argument of 
plaintiff-respondent's motion for summary judgment was 
the deposition of defendant when he refused to answer 1 
questions concerning "payoffs" on the grounds of self 
incrimination under the 5th amendment to the United 
States Constitution ( R. 60, pages 3, 4, 5 and 6). 
Appellants concede that refusal to testify may prop· 
17 
crly be considered by the trier of fact, under proper 
instruction from the court. 
Plaintiff's attorney also agrees with the concept of 
Jaw as appellant urges it. In the deposition of Preston 
L. Young taken July 29, 1966, the following took place 
after defendant's counsel advised defendant to refuse to 
answer questions concerning gambling ( R. 60, pages 
5-6) : 
"Question by Mr. King: Has your attorney 
advised you that refusal to answer in a civil action 
because your answer might intend to incriminate 
you, might induce the court to assume that your 
answer might be unfavorable?" 
"Answer: I refuse to answer based on the 
)th amendment." 
"Question: The refusal to answer doesn't lie 
on that because there is no fact involved there." 
"Mr. Bridwell: For your information Mr. 
King, that happens to be wrong. Yes, we have 
discussed that with him." 
"A1r. King: You have discussed with him 
that his refusal to answer this type of question 
will probably result in the court finding the fact 
that he has?" 
"Mr. Bridwell: I think that is a question for 
the trier of facts. Since you are counsel and not 
judge, that would be up to the judge or trier of 
facts. In this case it would be a jury. There is a 
rcbuttable presumption, or more accurately stated: 
it would entitle you to an instruction to the jury 
that thev mav find that way because of the re-
fusal.'' · · 
18 
"J,fr. King: I will accept that as being an 
accurate statement." 
Appellants feel that the right to reversal is so ele-
mental that they will not belabor this. However, in point 
is the language contained at 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, Sec. 
190: 
"The law creates a presumption, where the 
bu~den is _on. a p_arty to prove a material fact pe-
culiarly w1thm his knowledge and he fails without 
excuse to testify, that his testimony, if introduced, 
would be adverse to his interest." 
But, as stated at page 194 of 20 Am. Jur.: 
"In any event, where the presumption does 
ordinarily apply, it will be viewed as partaking 
of none of the character of affirmative proof. The 
presumptive effect of the failure of a witness to 
testify is obviously not tantamount to proof of the 
fact sought to be established through such witness. 
(Emphasis supplied). 
As has been set forth by this Court in Bullock vs. 
Desert Dodge Truck Center, Inc 11 Utah 2nd 1, 354 
Pac. 2nd 599, there must be a showing to authorize sum· 
mary judgment that is supported by evidence, admissions 
and inferences which, when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the loser, reveals there is no genuine issue 
concerning any material fact. That showing must pre· 
elude all reasonable possibility that the loser could, if 
given a trial, produce evidence which could reasonably 
sustain a judgment in his favor. Obviously, credibilit) 
of plaintiff-respondent's witnesses is for the jury to d~­
termine, after having received the benefit of cross exam1· 
nation by defendant's lawyers. 
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There is no ground upon which the trial court could 
possibly be sustained in granting plaintiff-respondent's 
motion. Such ruling is inconsistent with fair play and 
the concept that a citizen is entitled to his day in court. 
CONLCUSION 
It is clear appellant is entitled to a trial by jury -
with an added admonition by the court that trial pro-
w:·dings should move with expedition, but not by use of 
abusive process. This is a good case to set forth cautionary 
words for the benefit of future zealots, pushing untenable 
position for unworthy motive. 
It is urged that the court announce that even if 
plaintiff were to prevail in a trial by jury that defend-
ants were gaming, which has not been proved at this 
point, that such cannot serve to revoke a lease because 
ltgislative intent concerning gaming as set forth in Chap-
ter 27, Title 76, 1953 UCA is not capable of intelligent 
interpretation or application - or if it is definite, it is 
so far from reality and the sound constitutional concepts 
of reasonable classification as to be void. 
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